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ABSTRACT
Recently, there has been a growing interest in using online tech-
nologies to design protocols for secure electronic voting. The main
challenges include vote privacy and anonymity, ballot irrevocability
and transparency throughout the vote counting process. The intro-
duction of the blockchain as a basis for cryptocurrency protocols,
provides for the exploitation of the immutability and transparency
properties of these distributed ledgers.
In this paper, we discuss possible uses of the blockchain technol-
ogy to implement a secure and fair voting system. In particular, we
introduce a secret share-based voting system on the blockchain, the
so-called SHARVOT protocol1. Our solution uses Shamir’s Secret
Sharing to enable on-chain, i.e. within the transactions script, votes
submission and winning candidate determination. The protocol is
also using a shuffling technique, Circle Shuffle, to de-link voters
from their submissions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is a public ledger, managed by a peer-to-peer network,
offering security, data immutability and transparency to its users [1].
The advent of blockchain technology via the cryptocurrency Bit-
coin [2] has paved the way for the exploitation of the appealing
ledger’s properties for the most diverse applications. From health-
care to finance, blockchain-based solutions are created, using digital
identification and smart contracts.
In the sector of electronic voting and rating, numerous voting
platforms and startups focusing on building election systems on
the blockchain have emerged and attracted high attention and
funding 2. Indeed, features such as irrevocability and transparency
of information stored on chain make the technology ideally suited
for the development of secure voting systems.
Decentralisation is one of the biggest challenges. Usually exist-
ing solutions rely on a central authority to validate and correctly
count votes or feedback. The central authority may use different
cryptographic primitives, such as blind signatures and homomor-
phic encryption, to make the users’ submissions anonymous and
verifiable [3]. In Chaum’s protocol [4], participants send their votes
to mixing authorities that reshuffle and encrypt the votes before
broadcasting them, in order to disguise the link between votes and
voters. Among the existing decentralised cryptographic solutions,
Secure Multi-Party Computations protocols enable a set of users to
compute a function of their joint private inputs (which they want
1SHARVOT’s technologies are the subject of the following UK patent applications:
1703562.7 (06/03/2017). 1713800.9 (29/8/2017).
2http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/581918/EPRS_
ATA(2016)581918_EN.pdf Retrieved on Feb 4 2018.
to keep secret) without the need of a trusted third party, allowing
the parties to jointly compute the average of their ratings privately
and securely [5].
Focusing on how to preserve votes secrecy while guaranteeing
integrity of the process is also fundamental. In [6], participants
submit binary votes vi ∈ {0, 1} masked by adding a conveniently
created random variable together with a proof that the vote is
either 0 or 1. Despite the votes being concealed, one can verify the
vote format and prevent double submissions at the price of using
computationally expensive zero-knowledge proofs [7].
In this paper, we present solutions using the blockchain technol-
ogy to announce and build an election and determine a winning
candidate. In particular, we focus on how to broadcast the votes
within the transactions script and correctly count them while (i)
protecting voters privacy and anonymity (without the need of zero-
knowledge proofs), (ii) allowing only eligible users to cast their
preference, (iii) preventing attacks aimed at invalidating the ballot.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe the main
challenges faced when building a secure and fair voting protocol.
In Sec. 3, we present the SHARVOT protocol, a blockchain-based
solution using the technology presented in Sec. 2. Sec. 4, 5 are
devoted to discussion and conclusive remarks.
2 E-VOTING: BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we describe how to exploit the features of the ledger
and blockchain transactions to cast and correctly count ballots.
We discuss possible ways to store the ballot in-script and the vote
format respectively in Sec. 2.1 and 2.2. In Sec. 2.4 and Sec. 2.5 we
describe how to prevent submission from non-eligible voters and
how to protect vote’s secrecy.
2.1 Vote recording and data storage
Data storage on the blockchain is controversial. A conspicuous frac-
tion of developers believe that data may overload the full nodes by
increasing (i) disk storage costs and (ii) memory of the unspendable
transaction output (UTXO) set. Indeed, some applications create
pseudo-payments to use the recipient’s Bitcoin address as a 20-
bytes field, hence creating unspendable UTXO. According to the
Bitcoin protocol, data can instead be stored in script using the op-
code OP_RETURN < data >, which allows for the storage of 80
bytes of non-payments related data [1, 8].
An alternative solution exploits the pay-to-script-hash (P2SH)
script3 of a m-of-n multisignature transaction. According to these
scripts, n public keys Pi , i = 1, . . . ,n are recorded, and in order
to redeem the script, at least m ≤ n signatures Sj , j = 1, . . . ,m,
3P2SH scripts allow a user to lock UTXOs in a transaction in such a way that the
recipient must provide data to complete the script, therefore unlocking the UTXOs
sent to the Bitcoin address derived from the P2SH script.
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(corresponding to any subset of n public keys) must be provided
[1]. The m-of-n multisignature script is of the format:
OP_0 S1 . . . Sm < mP1 . . . Pn nOP_CHECKMULTISIG > . (1)
The space devoted to public keys can be used to store metadata.
Indeed, a multisignature address can be of the form q-of-n with
q ≥ 1, where the output can be spent by providing the signatures
associated to the q public keys while the remaining n − q public
key slots are used to encode data of a maximum size of 64 bytes
each. This eliminates the need for an additional unspendable UTXO
and allows anyone to access and verify the metadata stored in the
multisignature script. Consider for instance a 1-of-3 multisignature
script, where two of the three data elements reserved for public keys,
are used to store metadata instead. The script takes the following
format:
OP_0 S1 < OP_1m1m2 P1OP_3OP_CHECKMULTISIG > , (2)
wherem1,m2 are the metadata stored in the script. In voting pro-
tocols, the metadata elements could correspond to the set of en-
crypted/shuffled votes {vi }, i = 1, . . . ,m, of m users. Note the
caveat that, for the current version of the Bitcoin protocol, the max-
imum number of public keys allowed in a multisignature output is
15, hence limiting the maximum number of votes that can be stored
per multisignature script.
2.2 Vote commitment format
In general, a vote can be submitted in different formats: as a string
to indicate the name of a candidate, as a binary variable, an integer,
etc. In this paper, we express the vote as a 64-bytes key, denoted by
ki, j , where the index i relates to the candidate selected by the user
while j identifies a particular voter. We describe how to construct
these keys in the next section.
A voter Ui wishing to vote for candidate C submits their key
share kC,i . The key can also be concatenated with an identification
value for candidate C indicated with IdC. As an example, a vote
submission may take the following form: vi = k(C,i) | |IdC where | |
represents strings concatenation. The votevi can also be encrypted
with the public key PkC of the candidate before being embedded
in the script, e.g. vˆi = EncC (vi ). In the event that the candidate
C attempts to decrypt the vote, the component IdC serves as an
indicator to the candidate that the decryption was successful.
2.3 Voting using Shamir′s Secret Sharing
Secret Sharing schemes are examples of t-of-n threshold cryptosys-
tems, whereby a secret k is divided among n participants, such that
at least t + 1 participants are required to collaborate to reconstruct
k . The knowledge of any t pieces of the secret k leaves the latter
undetermined.
Shamir′s secret sharing [9] is based on Lagrange Polynomial
Interpolation and the secret k is assumed to be an element of a finite
field F of size p (p is a prime number). The scheme comprises a
dealer (dealer-less versions also exist) and a set of n participants
U1,U2, . . . ,Un .
In the presence of a dealer, the latter chooses an arbitrary t-
degree polynomial f (x) = ∑tj=0 ajx j and defines the secret as k =
f (0) = a0. The dealer then computes n points pi = (xi , f (xi )), i =
1, . . . ,n, and distributes the point pi to the participant Ui , i.e. each
participant receives their share ki = f (xi ) of the secret. Using the
Lagrange Polynomial Interpolation, if t + 1 out of the n participants
collaborate, they can reconstruct any point on f (x)with their shares
of the key k .
In Sec. 3 we show how key shares can be used to express a
preference and determine the winner in an election process.
2.4 Eligibility
E-voting systems are often targeted by Sybil attacks, where a single
user attempts to gain access to multiple identities and modify the
outcome of the election. In particular, on the blockchain users
can create multiple pseudonyms, i.e. public keys. To prevent this
kind of attacks, one could (i) introduce a fee per vote, which would
discourage an attacker from disrupting the process (the attackmight
be less cost-effective); (ii) introduce an identification system to allow
only registered voters to submit their ballot.
In the second case, a personal secret key ki , i = 1, . . . ,n, may
be given to a set of n endorsed users by a trusted authority, e.g. a
company announcing an internal election, a website etc. Endorsed
voters use their private key to encrypt their vote. The list of keys is
kept private by the verifier who later validates the submission: only
allowed users will have their vote correctly decrypted and counted.
A possible submission of vote vi is of the form vi ⊕ ki , where ⊕
represents the XOR of the two strings. Since vi ⊕ ki ⊕ ki = vi , the
verifier decrypts the vote by XOR-ing the string with the key of the
users ki . The decryption would only be available to users whose
key is known to the verifier.
Alternatively, the verifier can create a pair of public/private
key per user, (Pki , Ski ), and communicate to the eligible user the
public key only. The user can encrypt their ballot using Pki . The
vote submission, of the form EncPki (vi ), is sent to the verifier who
decrypts it using the private key Ski , DecSki (EncPki (vi )) = vi 4.
2.5 De-linking users and submissions
Research on de-anonymisation techniques shows that, despite the
use of pseudonyms in cryptocurrencies networks such as Bitcoin,
users may be exposed to attacks aimed at uncovering real identi-
ties [10, 11]. To address this vulnerability, a variety of coin mixing
solutions have been developed to enhance the untraceability of
coins flows and the unlinkability of transactions with the coins
owners [1]. These solutions typically disguise the links between
users’ addresses by mixing the individual input and output of users
in one single transaction, so-called CoinJoin transaction [12].
We developed a new decentralised solution, Circle Shuffle, for
randomizing the position of the output addresses that compose a
CoinJoin transaction. This protocol is designed in such a way that
no participant signing the transaction knows which of the output
addresses corresponds to a specific Bitcoin input address - therefore
addressing a limitation present in the CoinShuffle protocol, where at
least one party in the construction of the transaction has knowledge
of the input and output address of another party [13]. In the context
of voting protocols, shuffling techniques are useful to de-link users
from their votes, as we describe in Sec. 3.
4The functions DecSki , EncPki vary depending on the cryptosystem used. For in-
stance, in the RSA [7], given a public key (n, e) = k , the private keyd and the plaintext
to encrypt x , Enck (x ) = xemod n and Decd (Enck (x )) = (xemod n)d .
2
Figure 1: Circle Shuffle technique: (left) Shuffling of the encrypted output addresses. (right) Unveiling of the shuffled set of
output addresses. Oi and Ei , i = 1, . . . , 4, represent, respectively, the output and the public key used to encrypt it of the i-th
participant.
2.5.1 Initialisation. A random sequence S of n participants
U1,U2, . . . ,Un is decided. Each participant Ui has a corresponding
public/private key pair: (Ei ,ki ) where Ei = ki×G (G is the generator
of the Elliptic Curve chosen in the protocol [7]). The public keys
E1,E2, . . . ,En are made available to all participants. Additionally,
the first participant publishes the public key of an ephemeral pair:
(ED ,kD ).
2.5.2 Shuffling Phase. The shuffling phase begins when the first
participant,U1, encrypts their output address O1 with their public
key E1. The encrypted output address then comprises the ‘Set of
Shuffled Outputs’ (SSO).
U1 encrypts the SSO with E2, the public key of the next par-
ticipant in S , U2, and forwards the encrypted SSO to U2. U2 then
decrypts the SSO using k2, encrypts their output address O2 using
E2, and adds the newly encrypted address to the SSO.U2 shuffles the
order of the encrypted output addresses within the SSO, encrypts
the shuffled SSO with E3, and then forwards the encrypted SSO to
the third participantU3. This process continues until it reachesUn .
This phase is illustrated in Fig.1 (left) for a set of n = 4 participants.
Once the encrypted output address of the last participant is added
to the SSO, Un performs a final shuffle, encrypts the SSO with E1,
and sends the SSO back to the first participant,U1.
2.5.3 Unveiling Phase. At this point, the SSO is once again sent
to each of the n participants. The ephemeral public key ED , gener-
ated by the first participantU1, is used to ensure that no participant
gains information about the others during the protocol directly.
At the end of the first encryption-shuffle loop, the first participant
U1 is in possession of the set of shuffled outputs. U1 decrypts the
SSO, searches for their encrypted output address in the SSO and,
when found, decrypts the address using the associated private key
k1. The first participant then encryptsO1 with ED .U1 then encrypts
the new SSO with the public key of the second participant, P2, and
forwards the encrypted set toU2. The second participant in turns
decrypts the SSO using k2, finds their output address, decrypts it
using k2 and re-encrypts it with ED .U2 then encrypts the new SSO
with the public key P3 and forwards the encrypted set toU3. The
process continues until each participant has found their encrypted
output address in the SSO and replaced it with the corresponding
decrypted (and encrypted with ED ) value, see Fig. 1 (right).
The last participant encrypts the SSO with E1 (or ED ) and sends
the encrypted SSO to the first participant U1. The first participant
decrypts the SSO, and each encrypted address contained within
it, using the ephemeral private key kD . The permutation of the
output addresses in the SSO at that point represents the final order
in which the outputs are included in a CoinJoin transaction.
3 THE SHARVOT PROTOCOL
Consider n voters U1, . . . ,Un , wishing to express their preference
between several candidates. For simplicity, we will assume a choice
between two candidates, A and B. The SHARVOT protocol consists
in a voting solution utilising the Bitcoin blockchain; the protocol
is based on the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and a shuffling
technique, the Circle Shuffle.
Private key shares (based on the scheme presented in Sec. 2.3)
are assigned to the voters who commit fees in a n inputs - 1 output
transaction that stores, and therefore permanently records the votes.
Each input corresponds to the fees paid by a voter. The winning
candidate must receive both a majority of votes and a number of
votes past a specified threshold to collect the fees.
The SHARVOT protocol is designed with a failsafe such that any
Bitcoins committed by the voters is recoverable if no candidate
collects enough key shares to spend the UTXO in the transaction
signed by the voters. A dealer-based key share distribution scheme
is expected to be the most popular implementation of the SHARVOT
protocol, as having a dealer assume the role of an authority control
over the list of eligible voters.
Keys Generation. A public/private key pair is assigned by the
dealer to each of the two candidates, A and B, respectively PA =
kA×G and PB = kB×G . The candidates also possess a public/private
key pair each, MA = sA × G and MB = sB × G respectively, and
publish their public key. The dealer also publishes the public keys PA
and PB while keeping kA and kB private. For each secret, the dealer
computes n key shares, kA,i , i = 1, . . . ,n, and kB,i , i = 1, . . . ,n, and
distributes a pair of key shares (kA,i , kB,i ) to each voterUi . The key
shares are obtained using the t-of-n threshold scheme presented in
Sec. 2.3. As a result, the kA and kB values can only be determined
3
Figure 2: Transactions created in the SHARVOT protocol: the Voting Commitment Transaction casting the votes and spending
the voters’ fees, the transactions owned by each candidate, and the RefundTransaction returning the fees to the voters in case no
candidate wins.
when voters submit a sufficient number of votes t+1 for a particular
candidate.
Votes Submission. Each voter Ui encrypts their ballot for the
candidate of their choice, as explained in Sec. 2.2. For instance,
assumeUi gives their vote to a candidate B and therefore composes
vˆi = EncB (kB,i | |IdB). The list of shuffled votes (obtained using the
shuffling technique described in Sec. 2.5) is sent to the dealer.
P2SH address. The dealer, upon receiving the selected key shares
from the n voters, generates a P2SH address. The maximum number
of public keys allowed in a multisignature output is 15 (see Eq.1).
Hence, 13 fields in the multisignature script can be used to store
the vote of participants, while the two remaining fields can be used
to store the public key given by a candidate (MA orMB ) as well as
the public key assigned to the latter by the dealer (PA or PB ).
The P2SH script is therefore based on if − else statements, where
each statement is a multisignature script incorporating up to 13
votes and the aforementioned keys of a candidate. A final statement,
in the form of a scriptPubKey (S = k × G), is added in case no
candidate obtains a sufficient number of votes after a period of time
∆T .
Voting Commitment Transaction. The dealer then creates the
Voting Commitment Transaction (VCT) which includes one output
where n × x Bitcoins are sent to the P2SH address. The transac-
tion, illustrated in Fig. 2, is sent to the voters who add their input
(of x Bitcoins) and sign the VCT . The last participant to sign the
VCT sends it to the dealer who will submit it for inclusion in the
blockchain. Note that, while signing the VCT , the voters can verify
in perfect anonymity the correctness of their vote included in the
public record.
Refund Transaction. Before the VCT is actually broadcast on the
network, the dealer creates a Refund Transaction (RT) that spends
the output in the VCT and redistributes x Bitcoins to each voter.
The transaction is signed by the dealer using the private key k that
unlocks the third option (although the latter includes a locking time
preventing the UTXO to be spent before ∆T ). The dealer sends the
signed RT to the voters. Then and only then the VCT is submitted
for inclusion in the blockchain.
Ideally, the secret k should be controlled by both the dealer and
the voters so that under no circumstance the dealer can steal the
voting fees. One could, for instance, add a 1-of-n multisignature in
the script so that both the dealer’s signature and at least one voter’s
signature is needed to spend the UTXO of the Voting Commitment
Transaction.
Election result. In case one candidate successfully decrypts t + 1
or more key shares in the shuffled list included in the P2SH script,
the candidate can reconstruct the secret key needed to unlock the
n × x Bitcoins in the VCT . If no candidate obtains sufficient key
shares, the voters can broadcast the RT and recover their fees.
4 DISCUSSION
In the SHARVOT protocol, transactions I/O shuffling and voting
encryption techniques are implemented to guarantee the de-linking
of the users from their vote submission, while conveniently con-
structed transactions ensure a permanent and immutable record of
the ballot on the blockchain.
The dealer in SHARVOT certifies the voters’ eligibility through
the distribution of key shares. The concatenation of the votes with
an identifier for each candidate and the encryption of the vote
prevents the dealer (or the voters) from manipulating the vote.
Nevertheless, this does not completely prevent from the submission
of multiple and/or erroneous votes by the same participant(s) with
the malicious aim to disrupt the voting protocol. Such behaviour
is however discouraged by attaching a cost, i.e. the voting fee, to
the voter’s submission itself. Dealer-less versions exist although
these imply further rounds of communication among the voters
4
and therefore would be more popular for an internal voting process
with a limited number of participants. Finally, a natural limitation
of the protocol arises from the size of the script used to generate
the P2SH output address in the VCT .
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the SHARVOT protocol that uses the
blockchain technology to announce and build an election and de-
termine a winning candidate by collecting voters’ ballots in an
immutable, storage-efficient and anonymous manner.
Indeed, we showed how the use of multisignatures in P2SH
scripts allows for efficient storage of votes, which are encrypted
using candidates identifiers and de-linked from the voters using
shuffling techniques, and preserves the voters anonymity. Finally,
the use of the blockchain guarantees data immutability and trans-
parency.
We also discussed the vulnerabilities associated to the SHAR-
VOT protocol. Note that this solution remains secure, transparent
and completely anonymous, without the need for complex crypto-
graphic methods such as zero-knowledge proofs.
REFERENCES
[1] Andreas M. Antonopoulos. 2014. Mastering Bitcoin: unlocking digital cryptocur-
rencies (1st. ed.). O’Reilly Media, Inc.
[2] Satoshi Nakamoto. 2008. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. (2008).
[3] Robert Riemann and Stéphane Grumbach. 2017. Distributed Protocols at the
Rescue for Trustworthy Online Voting. ArXiv preprint 1705.04480 (2017).
[4] David L. Chaum. 1981. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Commun. ACM 24, 2 (1981), 84–90.
[5] Andrew C. Yao. 2015. Protocols for secure computations. International Conference
on Information and Communications Security, (2015), 82–96.
[6] Zhichao Zhao and T-H. Hubert Chan. 2015. How to vote privately using bitcoin.
International Conference on Information and Communications Security, (2015),
160–164.
[7] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. 2014. Introduction to modern cryptography.
CRC press.
[8] Massimo Bartoletti and Livio Pompianu. 2017. An analysis of Bitcoin
OP_RETURN metadata. ArXiv preprint 1702.01024 (2017).
[9] Adi Shamir. 1979. How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22, 11 (1979), 612–613.
[10] Dmitry Khovratovich Biryukov, Alex and Ivan Pustogarov. 2014. Deanonymi-
sation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network. Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2014), 15–29.
[11] QingChun ShenTu and JianPing Yu. 2015. Research on Anonymization and
De-anonymization in the Bitcoin System. ArXiv preprint 1510.07782 (2015).
[12] Greg Maxwell. 2013. CoinJoin: Bitcoin privacy for the real world. Post on Bitcoin
Forum (2013). Retrieved Feb 4, 2018 from https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=
279249.0
[13] Pedro Moreno-Sanchez Ruffing, Tim and Aniket Kate. 2014. CoinShuffle: Practical
decentralized coin mixing for Bitcoin. European Symposium on Research in
Computer Security (2014), 345–364.
5
